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STATE AND LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS
The increasing emphasis being placed upon the federal tax implica-
tions of various financial transactions has tended to overshadow the im-
portance of many state and local tax problems. Prominent among these
problems is the taxation of real and personal property. Mr. Carlton B.
Schnell reviews the types of real property which are exempt from the
Ohio real property tax. He notes the inconsistencies which have marked
the recent decisions in this area and urges that the Tax Study Commis-
sion make constructive recommendations to the legislature for changes
in the tax exemption statutes. Mr. Kenneth Humer outlines several of
the more important procedures relating to the Ohio personal property
tax. After discussing the proper method of computing the tax, he briefly
notes the procedure for claiming a deduction from book value and ana-
lyzes in detail the advantages available through the so-called federal
election.
Real Property Tax Exemptions
in Ohio-A Review and Critique
Carlton B. Schnell
rHE REAL PROPERTY tax is well established in this country
and is still one of the principal sources for financing local gov-
ernment. Despite its long history, each year there is a large volume
of litigation involving real property taxation. The principal area of
this litigation is in the exemp-
tion field. This article will re-
THE AUTHOR (B.A., LL.B., Yale Uni- view some of the ground rules
versity) is a practicing attorney in Cleve-
land, Ohio. on exemptions, explore the areas
of current dispute, and suggest
some possible solutions.'
Initially, it is important to keep in mind that each time a deter-
mination is made that a particular parcel of property is exempt from
taxation, the tax burden placed upon the other property in the com-
munity is increased proportionately. It is difficult, therefore, to sepa-
l On February 16, 1966, the Ohio Supreme Court decided two cases of great impor-
tance in this area. Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135,
214 N.E.2d 431 (1966); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d
179, 214 N.E.2d 441 (1966) (per curiam). In Philada Home Fund, Judge Schneider
urged in a very strong dissenting opinion that:
We are not composed to determine policy and I have no doubt that the ma-
jority is as sincerely convinced that its view is in accord with the constitu-
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rate the relevant policy arguments from the legal distinctions in-
volved. In examining legal arguments, it is important not to lose
sight of the fact that what is really being decided is whether or not
the particular use to which property is being put should be supported
by the community-at-large, rather than by the particular organiza-
tion or institution making the exemption claim.
Historically, exemptions from taxation stemmed from the con-
cept that property used by the public generally should not be taxed,
since to do so would merely result in a return of public funds to the
public. This concept, however, has been broadened to include uses
which were not of a strictly public nature, but which arguably did
involve some public benefit2
The legislature may impose any tax it so desires, no matter how
arbitrary, so long as the tax conforms to the general constitutional
requirements of uniformity, due process, and equal protection.3 Sec-
tion 5709.01 of the Ohio Revised Code subjects all real property in
the state to taxation, except that which is expressly exempted.
In Ohio, it is not clear whether there is any constitutional limita-
tion on the power of the legislature to exempt real property from
taxation.' The better view would seem to be that the legislature is
not limited except by article I of the United States Constitution. Be-
tional and legislative policy of this state as I am that my view exemplified
that policy. This is not a novel situation. If there is a reported dase on tax
exemption involving residential use of property within the last century which
was dcided without a division of this Court, I have yet to discover it. I dis-
sent in order to record that which I believe is the import of today's decision
so that the public and the General Assembly may be governed accordingly.
Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals; supra at 140, 214, N.2d at
434-35.
For a discussion of the history and theory of real property tax exemption, see Note,
Exemption of Eduacational, Philanthropic and Religious Institutions From State Real
Property Taxes, 64 HARV. L REv.-288 (1950).
3 See generally OHIo CONST. art. XII, § 2.
4 OMO CONST. art. XII, 5 2. The section states: !Without limiting the general
power * * * to determine the subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions there-
from, general laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public school houses,
houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable
purposes and public property used exclusively for any public purpose."
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that this provision does not limit the power of
the General Assembly to exempt personal property from taxation. Struble v. Davis,
132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.B.2d 684 (1937). However, they have held that exemptions
of real property are limited to those described in OIIO CONST. art. XII, § 2. Youngs-
town Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Evatrt, 143 Ohio St. 268, 55 NB.2d 122
(1944). This interpretation has been severely criticized. See Caren, Constitutional
Limitations on the Exemption of Real Property From Taxation, 11 OHIo ST. L.J. 207
(1950). Perhaps the most important point to note is that there is no constitutional right
to exemption; the state has the legal right to tax any and all property, including church
and school property.
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fore examining the specific exemption provisions, some consideration
should be given to concepts which apply to each of the specific ex-
emption provisions.
I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF EXEMPTIONS
A. Use of Land Test in Determining Eligibility for Exemptions
An appropriate starting point is the proposition that it is the
land itself and not the ownership of the land which is subject to
taxation; accordingly, it is the use of the land that establishes an
exemption and not the identity of the owner or the form of owner-
ship of the land. The case of National Headquarters D.A.V. v.
Bowers5 is perhaps the best example of this principle. There, the
property involved was used by the Disabled American Veterans
(D.A.V.) to assemble and distribute the small plastic replicas
of motor vehicle licenses which are sold to produce income for
the organization. The supreme court conceded that the D.A.V.
was organized for charitable purposes, but found that the property
in question was not used exclusively for those purposes and there-
fore did not meet the constitutional test for exemption. Thus, the
court stated: "The use, not the ownership, is the test. It is the
property, not the institution, that is being taxed."'  It, of course,
makes no difference that the income generated from the use is itself
used exclusively for charitable purposes.7
B. The Problem of Prospective Use
Another problem that frequently arises in exemption cases
is whether prospective use of property for an exempt purpose
by an institution qualifies the property for exemption. It may
generally be stated that if the property is acquired by a dearly
exempt organization and no nonexempt use is made of the prop-
erty, the exemption will apply so long as it remains abundantly
clear that the ultimate use will be for an exempt purpose.' Illus-
trative of this proposition is Carney v. Cleveland City School Dist.,'
which involved the acquisition by the Library Board of the City of
5 171 Ohio St. 312, 170 NE.2d 731 (1960).
61d. at 314, 170 N.E.2d at 733.
7 Denison Univ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 429, 440, 183 N.E.2d 773,
780 (1962); Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924 (1915).
S Carney v. Cleveland City School Dist., 169 Ohio St. 65, 157 N.E.2d 311 (1959);
Bord of Educ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 564, 80 N.E.2d 156 (1948).
9 Carney v. Cleveland City School Dist., supra note 8.
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Cleveland of a building for the purpose of library expansion. Pre-
viously, the building had been used by a newspaper. The building
was acquired in December of 1957 and the Library Board applied
for an exemption for 1958. On tax listing day, the Library Board
had not started alterations on the building nor was it actually using
the building as a library facility. Nonetheless, the building was
held exempt from taxation as public property used exclusively for
public purposes, even though at that time there was no such use by
the public.
Other cases involving prospective use have held that it is neces-
sary to show a positive immediate intent to use the land for the ex-
empt purpose; there must be some concrete evidence of this intent,
or the exemption will not be allowed."0
C. Partial Exemptions
According to section 5713.04 of the Ohio Revised Code, an or-
ganization may obtain a partial exemption from property taxation.
The possible benefits of this provision should not be overlooked.
In essence, the section provides that if a parcel of improved or un-
improved realty has a single ownership and is so used that a part
thereof, if a separate entity, would be exempt from taxation, the
listing may be split and the part used exclusively for exempt pur-
poses regarded as a separate entity, with the balance used for non-
exempt purposes listed separately and taxed accordingly. The prop-
erty may be split vertically, horizontally, or otherwise, but it may
not be divided on a percentage of use basis.'1
D. Construction of Exemption Statutes
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that exemption statutes are
to be strictly construed against the one who is seeking the exemp-
tion. 2 However, in recent years this rule has been honored only
where it has suited the court's purpose to do so. It is the writer's
impression that in some areas the court is moving in the direction
10 Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214 N.E.2d 441
(1966). Holy Trinity Protestant Episcopal Church v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 103, 173
N.E.2d 682 (1961).
11Trustees of Church of God v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St. 517, 112
N.E.2d 633 (1953); Goldman v. L. B. Harrison Club, 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E.2d
530 (1952); Welfare Fed'n v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E.2d 813 (1945).
12 Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 399, 403, 55 N.E.2d 660, 662
(1944).
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of those states which follow a rule of liberal construction of exemp-
tion statutes.'
I. SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS
A. Charitable Use
The most important of the specific exemptions is contained in
section 5709.12 of the Revised Code. This section grants an exemp-
tion for property which is owned by an institution and which is used
exclusively for charitable purposes. The institution may be either
public or private, so long as the property itself is used exclusively
for charitable purposes. 4 However, if the institution is private, not
only must the land itself be used for charitable purposes, but the
institution must be charitable as well. For example, in a case in
which the property in question was a playground owned by the
American Legion, which the Legion permitted the general public to
use, it was held that although the use itself was charitable, the ex-
emption was not applicable since the institution itself was not pri-
marily charitable in nature.'5
If private property is leased to a charitable institution on some-
thing other than a perpetual lease, this will not entitle the property
to exemption.'" This is true even though the lease may require the
lessee to pay taxes.
The fact that a charge is made for services rendered by an other-
wise charitable organization does not in and of itself destroy the
charitable nature of the use, so long as there is general availability
of the property to any member of the public consistent with the con-
tinued economic operation of the institution.'
Despite the aforementioned rule of strict construction, the Ohio
Supreme Court has liberally construed the statutory provision re-
3. See generally Caren, supra note 4, at 215.
14 Denison Univ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St. 2d 17, 205 N.E.2d 896
(1965); Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St 201 (1876); Gerke v.
Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
1 5 Euclid Post 343 Am. Legion, Ohio B.T.A. No. 45029 (1961).
16 Columbus Youth League v. County Bd. of Revision, 172 Ohio St. 156, 174 N.E.2d
110 (1961); Humphries v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201 (1876). A con-
veyance to a charitable institution with an option to repurchase at a nominal amount
has withstood attack. Zangerle v. State, 120 Ohio St. 139, 165 N.E. 709 (1929).
17 College Preparatory School for Girls v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 408, 59 N.E.2d 142
(1945). However, if all are required to pay, the charitable purpose may become sec-
ondary. See Beerman Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 152 Ohio St. 179, 87
N.E.2d 474 (1949); Cleveland Branch of the Guild of St. Barnabas for Nurses v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 484, 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948).
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quiring "exclusive" use. The best example of this construction is
found in Goldman v. Friars Club, Inc.,"8 which involved a number
of institutions including the Young Men's Christian Association
(YMCA) and Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).
The property belonged to an admittedly nonprofit corporation
whose objective was the spiritual and physical welfare of the people
of Cincinnati. It consisted of a four-story building of which the
top two floors were occupied as a place of residence by young men
who paid low rentals. The rates varied according to ability to pay
and type of room occupied. The club also operated snack bars and
a restaurant as well as a bowling alley. The Board of Tax Appeals
found that the dormitory, snack bar, bowling alley, and restaurant
were not used exclusively for charitable purposes and therefore de-
termined that only seventy-four per cent of the building should be
exempt. The supreme court noted its many decisions to the effect
that the use of land for low-rent housing for people of limited in-
come does not entitle the owner to an exemption, and that even
though the income from a commercial enterprise is devoted to char-
ity, the property is not exempt. But the court, nevertheless, found
this property exempt and adopted the following reasoning:
The board apparently did not give consideration to the character
of these uses as connected with and incidental to the overall pro-
gram carried on within the properties and the charitable nature
of each institution as a whole. These overall programs carried on
by these institutions devoted to charity without any commercial
aspect or commercial profit, in the opinion of the court, differenti-
ate the instant cases, as to the specific facts, from the cases herein-
before cited.' 9
The test thus articulated has little to do with the specific use of the
property. 0 It is submitted that the court really meant that, in its
opinion, this property should be exempt regardless of the specific
directive of section 5709.12 that the property be used exclusively
for charitable purposes. In the opinion, the word "principally"
was inserted in lieu of "exclusively."
A similar example of statutory interpretation is found in Ault-
-man Hosp. Ass'n v. Evatt.2' There the court held that a student
nurses' home located near an exempt hospital was also exempt. The
18158 Ohio St. 185, 107 N.B.2d 518 (1952).
19 1d. at 199, 107 NXE.2d at 524.
200n the same day, the court denied an exemption in a similar case where the only
distinction was the difference in the overall program. Goldman v. L. B. Harrison Club,
158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E.2d 530 (1952).
21140 Ohio St. 114, 42 N.E.2d 646 (1942).
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charitable purpose was found in the fact that the home was "a neces-
sary part of the hospital institution itself."22  However, there are
subsequent decisions which distinguish the Aultman case, although
their factual patterns are quite similar.23
B. Educational and Religious Use
Section 5709.07 of the Revised Code governs exemptions given
to schools, churches, and colleges. The most recent pronouncement
of the supreme court interpreting this section is Denison Univ. v.
Board of Tax Appeals.24 The university filed three separate appli-
cations for exemption from taxation. The first related to three par-
cels of land comprising a farm upon which were located certain
buildings used for university maintenance and farming. The sec-
ond concerned the president's home which was located upon the
campus and occupied by the president and his family. The third
related to a house and eight-acre tract located about a mile-and-a-
half from the campus which was used for lodging official guests of
the university. The Board of Tax Appeals denied all three appli-
cations on the ground that the use in each case was not exclusively
for a charitable purpose. In its appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court,
the university relied on section 5709.07, as well as section 5709.12.
The former grants an exemption to "public colleges and academies
and all buildings connected therewith, and all lands connected with
public institutions of learning, not used with a view to profit ...."
Under this section, there is no requirement that the use be exclu-
sively for a charitable or public purpose.25 In upholding the ex-
emptions, the court disregarded many prior decisions,26 and instead
relied principally on the case of Kenyon College v. Schnebly,27 de-
cided by a lower court in 1909 and affirmed by the supreme court
2 21d. at 117, 42 N.E.2d at 647.
2 3 Doctors Hosp. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 283, 286-87, 181 N.E.2d
702, 704-05 (1962) (concurring opinion); Cleveland Branch of the Guild of St. Bar-
nabas for Nurses v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 484, 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948);
In the Matter of Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, Ohio B.T.A. No. 551991 (April 15, 1965). See
also Note, Exemption from Taxation of Residences Owned by Charitable, Religious and
Educational Institutions in Ohio, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 549 (1963).
242 Ohio St. 2d 17, 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965).
25 However, until the Denison case the court had always required that there be such
exclusive charitable use, presumably because of the requirement in OI-O CoNsT. art.
XII, § 2. See Denison Univ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d
773 (1962); Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91
N.E.2d 497 (1950).
26 See Note, supra note 23 and cases cited therein.
278 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 160 (1909), afj'd, 81 Ohio St. 514, 91 N.E. 1130 (1909).
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in that same year without opinion. In distinguishing a number of
prior cases which held that residence property could not be exempt, 8
the court referred to the fact that the statute governing here, unlike
the statutes governing parish houses and other similar residence
property, does not require that the use be exclusive, but only that
the buildings involved be connected with the university and that
there be a reasonable certainty that they are to be used in furthering
and carrying out the necessary objects and purposes of the college.
To arrive at this result, the court had to overrule, at least in part,
two prior decisions."9 It also had to recognize that its recent 1962
opinion in another Denison Univ. v. Board of Tax Appeals case,"°
which dealt with claims for exemption of college fraternity houses,
contained statements that were inconsistent with its decision in the
instant case.
The 1965 Denison decision and the recent case of Philada Home
Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals"' have further confused the status of
residence property used by exempt organizations. Buildings occu-
pied by priests or members of the ministry are not exempt, since
they are not used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes, and
they are not "houses used exclusively for public worship."3  How-
ever, under the approach of the supreme court in Denison and the
broadened interpretation of the statutes, it is possible that such re-
sults may be reversed. A claim could certainly be made under sec-
tion 5709.12 that the occupancy of such property is a use for a
charitable purpose. It must also be assumed that any residence
property occupied by a faculty at a private school is probably ex-
empt under the Denison decision despite an earlier case which held
2 8 Denison Univ. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d 773
(1962); Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91
N.E.2d 497 (1950). The latter case may have overruled Kenyon College v. Schnebly,
81 Ohio St. 514, 91 N.E. 1130 (1909).
2 9 City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E.2d 480
(1950); Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra note 28; Ursuline
Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 141 Ohio St. 563, 49 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
30 173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
315 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214 N.E.2d 431 (1966).
32 Omo REv. CODE § 5709.07. Waterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E.
962 (1907); Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874). Similarly, it has been held
that use by religious personnel other than ministers and priests will cause a loss of ex-
empt status. Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948). However,
where a portion of the building was used for housing of a caretaker, it was nevertheless
held exempt. I& re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d
270 (1949); St. Paul's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Board of Tax Appeals, 114
Ohio App. 330, 182 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
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to the contrary.33 Arguably, property used for residence quarters
for interns or residents of a hospital may now be exempt.34 It is
very difficult to justify a property tax exemption for a building
which is occupied as a private residence, whether by a president of
a university, a minister or priest, a hospital intern, nurses, or paying
guests of the YMCA or YWCA, and on the basis of whether the
occupancy is with or without a family.
C. Public Use
Section 5709.08 of the Revised Code, which exempts govern-
ment and public property, is similar to section 5709.12 in that both
require the use of the property to be exclusively for a public pur-
pose. 5 The results in the cases under this section again seem to de-
pend upon the court's view of what is or is not a desirable public
subsidy. 6 Logically, there is great difficulty in justifying the grant-
ing of an exemption to a municipal public utility 7 or municipally
owned airport,8 but denying it to a municipally owned stadium" or
off-street parking facility.4" There seems to be no rational distinction
between the exemption of airport property owned and operated by
a city and the denial of the exemption to that identical property
when it is leased to a private corporation." However, the case of
3 8 Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91 N.E.2d
497 (1950).
34 A contrary result was reached in Doctors Hosp. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173
Ohio St. 283, 181 N.E.2d 702 (1962), where the court stated that residence in a dwell-
ing with a family was a private use.
35 OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.08. The section states: "Real or personal property
belonging to the State or the United States used exclusively for a public purpose, and
public property used exclusively for a public purpose, shall be exempt from taxation."
3 6 Property is now held to be exempt under OHIo REV. CODE § 5709.08 regardless
of whether the use is to carry on a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental
function. Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 167 Ohio St. 273, 147 N.E.2d 857
(1958); Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 167 Ohio St. 263, 147 N.E.2d 663
(1958), overruling Zangerle v. City of Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720
(1945); In re Application for Exemption of Real Property, 164 Ohio St. 605, 132
N.E.2d 747 (1956). This was not always true; see Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals,
153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950).
37
In re Exemption from Taxation, 164 Ohio St. 605, 132 N.E.2d 747 (1956).
3 8 Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
3 9 Board of Park Comm'rs v. Board of Tax Appeals, 160 Ohio St. 451, 116 N.E.2d
725 (1954) (sports arena); Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 91
N.E.2d 480 (1950). But cf. City of Cleveland v. Carney, 172 Ohio St. 189, 174 N.E.2d
254 (1961) (municipal auditorium exempt).
40 OHO REV. CODE § 717.05.
41 City of Cleveland v. Perk, 2 Ohio St. 2d 173, 207 N.E.2d 556 (1965); Carney
v. City of Cleveland, 173 Ohio St. 56, 180 N.E.2d 214 (1962); Toledo v. Jenkins, 143
Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
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City of Cleveland v. Perk,42 decided in 1965, held that property
loses its identity as public property used exclusively for public pur-
poses when it is leased to a private corporation. On the other hand,
another recent decision by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals
has held that parking lots owned and operated by a nonprofit or-
ganization are considered to be used exclusively for charitable pur-
poses, even though the person using the lot is charged a fee.43
IH. CONCLUSION
With such conflicting decisions, it is understandably very diffi-
cult for municipalities to plan the development of public facilities
when they are uncertain as to whether the property involved will
or will not be subject to tax. It is similarly very difficult for many
private institutions, such as hospitals, clinics, and other similar
organizations to budget funds when there exists the possibility that
a taxpayer's suit will be brought claiming that the organization or
its use of the property is noncharitable. Such suits may very well
be successful.44 Even churches, which currently are opening more
and more of their facilities for uses other than "religious worship,"
are in danger of losing their exempt status. It is unfortunate that
each one of these cases must be decided upon a case-by-case ap-
proach; it is to be hoped that the current Tax Study Commission 5
will recommend to the legislature some constructive changes in the
tax exemption statutes.
There is an arbitrary, but a very workable, solution to the cur-
rent difficulty. The exemption statutes could be amended to pro-
vide exemptions for (1) all property owned by governmental units,
regardless of use; and (2) all property owned by schools, colleges,
and universities, whether public or private. All other property
would be subject to tax.
The theory justifying the exemption of publicly owned property
is that presumably no such property would be owned by a govern-
mental unit unless it does in fact exist for the public benefit. This
422 Ohio St. 2d 173, 207 N.E.2d 556 (1965).
4SUniversity Circle Dev. Foundation v. Perk, 200 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964).
44 A very recent example in the area of low-cost public housing is a suit now pend-
ing in the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, claiming that the Cleveland Metro-
politan Housing Authority property should not be tax exempt. See Dayton Metropoli-
tan Housing Authority v. Evart, 143 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E.2d 896 (1944) (not exempt
under this section).
45 This Commission was created by House Bill 261 for the purpose of conducting
a comprehensive study of the entire structure of Ohio taxation.
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coincides with the historic concept of tax exemption. Similarly, the
justification for exempting schools, colleges, and universities lies in
the deeply rooted concept that every child is entitled to a free public
education through high school; certainly the promotion of educa-
tional opportunity is a goal which is commonly accepted by all of
society. As far as including private schools in the exempt category,
the justification is that there is a benefit of a public nature to be
served in fostering and promoting the continued existence and
growth of private as well as public universities. By absorbing a por-
tion of the educational burden, the private schools are relieving the
public of the additional cost of expanding the public facilities.
It may be argued that there is no similar justification for the
other exemptions currently recognized by the Ohio statutes.4" The
additional property added to the tax duplicates through the elimina-
tion of these exemptions would substantially broaden the tax base
and thereby greatly relieve some of the financial pressures on local
government. To the extent that it is necessary for such organiza-
tions and institutions to own real property, this added cost would be
considered a part of the cost of their continued existence and would
have to be supported by those who are interested in such existence.
In order to avoid any undue hardship by virtue of a sudden imposi-
tion of tax, the legislature could provide for a scaling of the tax
base over a period of time in order to permit those institutions that
wish to do so to dispose of their property or to otherwise budget the
increased cost.
Such a solution may be more drastic than the current confusion
demands. However, in the author's opinion, it is critical that the
legislature make a more deliberate choice of the type of activities
and organizations which deserve public subsidy. If it fails to do so,
and if the current liberalization of the exemption statutes by the
court continues, there will be mounting financial and political pres-
sure to curb all exemptions. The public has a right to a more pre-
cise delineation of those organizations which are being subsidized.
4 6 This is apart from the very general proposition that it is "good" to promote char-
itable purposes. Such proposition is, of course, recognized by the federal tax laws and
amounts to a very substantial indirect subsidy for such organizations by the Government
Perhaps the real justification for indirect government subsidy is to avoid direct govern-
ment subsidy. If private philanthropy does not meet the public's needs, the inevitable
result will be increased government activity with its resultant bureaucratic deficiencies.
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